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THE 1976 AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT 

GOVERNING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 

BETWEEN TEACHER ORGANIZATIONS AND 





by Peter Adomeit* 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1976, the Connecticut General Assembly amended the Teach­
er Negotiation Actl in several significant ways. This article reviews 
these amendments. 2 
The first statute governing teacher bargaining in Connecticut, 
enacted in 1965,3 (this statute and its pre-1976 amendments will be 
referred to as the 1965 Act) borrowed several principles from the 
National Labor Relations Act:4 The right of employees to bargain 
collectively; and to designate representatives for purposes of bar­
gaining;6 the principle of exclusive representation permitting one 
employee organization to bargain on behalf of the entire bargaining 
* B.A., Carleton College; J.D., University of Minnesota; Associate Professor of 1.<1w, 
University of Connecticut School of Law. 
1. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-153a to 153g (1975) (current version at Casso GE.~. 
STAT. §§ 10-153a to 153g (1977». Although there were some revisions in 1967, 1969, 
and 1973, see note 3 infra, the 1965 Act remained substantially unchanged until the 
1976 Amendments. When the text speaks of the 1965 Act, it is referring to the 1965 Act 
and its pre-1976 amendments, which have been codified in the 1975 Connecticut Gen­
eral Statutes. All footnote references will be to the 1975 (.-odification and parenthetically 
to the current version. 
2. 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts 76-403 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-15301 to 153g 
(1977» [hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Amendments). 
3. 1965 Conn. Pub. Acts 298. This act's pre-1976 amendments were 1973 Conn. Pub. 
Acts 73-391, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 811, and 1967 Conn. Pub. Acts 752. The General 
Assembly recognized the right of teachers to join or not to join professional organiza­
tions in 1961. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153a (1964) (current version at Coss. GE.~. STAT. 
§ 10-153a (1977». In 1951, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that bargaining in the 
absence of a statute was lawful. See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 
Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951). 
4. National Labor Relations Act, § 7,29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). 
5. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 100153b(e) (1975) (current version at Coss. GES. STAT. 
§ 10-153b(e) (1977». 
6. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(c) (1975) (current version at Coss. GES. STAT. 
§ 10-153b(c) (1977». 
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unit;7 the right to an election to determine which organization should 
represent the employees, with certification of the victor;8 the obliga­
tion of both labor and management to bargain in good faith;D and a 
prohibition against interference with the rights afforded employees by 
the Act. 10 The 1965 Act also guaranteed rival teacher organizations 
"equal access" to teachers and to school facilities such as mail boxes 
and bulletin boards. ll 
There were four major differences between the 1965 Teacher 
Negotiation Act and the National Labor Relations Act. First, and 
perhaps foremost, teachers could not strike--at least not lawfully. 12 
To assist the parties in reaching agreement in the absence of the right 
to strike, the 1965 Act provided for mandatory mediation13 and man­
datory, but nonbinding, arbitration. 14 
Second, the administration of the 1965 Act was not given over to 
an administrative agency. While the United States Congress en­
trusted the primary responsibility for enforcing the National Labor 
Relations Act to the National Labor Relations Board, the Connecticut 
General Assembly did not entrust the 1965 Teacher Act to the Con­
necticut State Board of Labor Relations-a decision that was to have 
important consequences. Because the Connecticut State Department 
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(e) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153b(e) (1977». 
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153b(d) (1977». 
9. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 1O-153d (1977». The provisions concerning good faith bargaining are now located at 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1977). 
10. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153d (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153d (1977». The provisions concerning interference with the rights afforded em· 
ployees are now located at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1977). 
11. This right was conditioned upon "the absence of any recognition or certification" 
of any teacher organization. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1977». However, § 10-153c provided unconditionally that 
"[elach organization shall have, during the election process, equal access to school mail 
boxes and facilities." CONN. GEN. STAT. § § 1O·153c (1975) (current version at CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 1O-153c (1977». 
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O·153e (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153e (1977». 
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153f (1977». The same section authorized the Secretary to the State Board of Edu· 
cation to recommend a basis for settlement. This was a power the mediators and the 
Secretary rarely exercised. (In Connecticut, the positions of Secretary to the State Board 
of Education and Connecticut Commissioner of Education are traditionally held by the 
same person.) 
14. "The decision of the arbitrators shall be advisory and shall not be binding upon 
the parties to the dispute." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current version at 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1977». 
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of Education was given the duty of providing mediators and arbi­
trators to the parties,15 it acts more like the Federal ~lediation and 
Conciliation Service, or the American Arbitration Association, th.m a 
labor board. 
Third, the Department of Education had no power whatsoever to 
enforce the guarantees and proscriptions of the 1965 Act. 1G If labor or 
management committed an unfair labor practice, there was no labor 
board to tum to. In fact, the 1965 Act did not contain an unfair labor 
practice section as such. 17 It guaranteed that teachers could exercise 
statutory rights without interference or coercion18 and it required 
good faith bargaining,19 but that was all. The other unfair labor prac­
tices proscribed in section 8(a) and (b) of the National Labor Relations 
Act20 were absent from the 1965 Teacher Act. 
Fourth, the Connecticut Act simply left it to the parties to de­
cide who would conduct their elections. 21 Virtually all elections were 
conducted by a private organization, the American Arbitration Associ­
ation, rather than by an administrative agency such as the NLRB or 
the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations. Under the National 
Labor Relations Act, the employer does not pay for the cost of the 
election; nor do the municipalities under Connecticut's ~lunicipal 
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current version llt Coss. GE.... STAT. 
§ 10-153f (1977). 
The American Arbitration Association (AAA), II prh'llte, nonprofit organization, pro­
vides lists of labor arbitrators upon request to those with arbitration c1auselt in their 
collective bargaining agreements. The Federnl Mediation llnd Conciliation Service pro­
vides a similar service. See F. Eu:oURl & E. ELKOURl, How ARBlTRATIOS WORKS 
24-25 (3rd ed. 1973). 
16. The Secretary to the State Board of Education could force either party to mediate 
a dispute, and the Secretary could recommend a basis for settlement, but the powers of 
the office stopped there. The Secretary could not force a settlement or prevent" strike. 
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current version at Cm-m. GE. ... STAT. § 100153f 
(1977». 
17. In 1975, the General Assembly, by 1975 Conn. Special Act 75-91. ,mtllorized tlte 
State Board of Education to prepare and submit to tlte Joint Stllnding Committee on 
Education of the General Assembly "guidelines" governing good faitll bargaining. scope 
of negotiations, and unfair labor practices. The guidelines issued were of unknown legal 
force, being neither statutes nor regulations. They appeared to some to be .Ill interim 
political step toward placing an unfair labor practice section into the statute. 
18. This first appeared in 1969 Conn. Pub. Act 811, § I (amending Coss. GE..... 
STAT. § 10-153a (1968». 
19. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at Coss. GES. STAT. 
§ 10-153d (1977». The provisions concerning good faith bargaining are now locolted at 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1977». 
20. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 158!1l), (b). 
21. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version at Coss. GE..... STAT. 
§ 10-153b(d) (1977». The overwhelming choice was the AAA. The town of ~teriden 
once used the town clerk's office, but that choice was a clear exception. 
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Employee Relations Act. 22 But under the 1965 Teacher Act, the cost 
of administering the elections, approximately one dollar per vote, was 
paid by the local board of education. 23 
II. UNIT DETERMINATION AND ELECTIONS: THE 1965 ACT 
Under the 1965 Act the bargaining unit consisted of those pro­
fessionals working in positions "requiring a teaching or special ser­
yices certificate."24 Administrators were entitled to a separate unit. 25 
Excluded from the teachers' unit were the superintendent and the 
assistant superintendents, board negotiators, those responsible for 
personnel relations or budget preparation, and "temporary substitutes 
and all noncertified employees. "26 Professionals such as social work­
ers, psychologists, librarians, and reading consultants were all re­
quired to hold a certificate and therefore were included in the 
teacher unit. Teachers' aides, janitors, groundskeepers, and bus driv­
ers were not required to hold certificates and were excluded from the 
teachers' unit. 
The 1965 Act left to the parties to decide who would conduct 
their election. 27 The American Arbitration Association (AAA), a pri­
vate agency that conducts bargaining unit elections, has presided over 
virtually every teacher election in Connecticut since the 1965 Act. 
The AAA maintains a position of strict neutrality, refusing to make 
any decision bearing on the election that may affect the outcome. For 
example, the AAA will not set the date of the election, or the time, 
or the polling places, or even the position of the parties on the ballot. 
Before accepting any election duty, the AAA requires the parties to 
sign an agreement containing a provision for a moderator.2B If the 
22. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-471 (1977). 
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153b(d) (1977». The election costs consisted of the fees of the AAA and the elec­
tion moderator. 
24. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(a)(2) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153b(a)(2) (1977». 
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(a)(I) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153b(a)(I) (1977». 
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153b(b) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 1O-153b(b) (1977». 
27. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. 
28. The AAA standard election agreement reads in part: "The undersigned parties 
have agreed that the AAA shall be the impartial agency to administer a teacher rep­
resentative election, in accordance with its election rules and the Connecticut General 
Statutes." The 1970 AAA Election Rules, (on file at the office of the AAA, 37 Lewis St., 
Hartford, Conn.) read in part: 
The AAA ... may at any time appoint an election arbitrator or arbitrators from 
its national panel of arbitrators.... The election arbitrator shall interpret and 
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parties cannot agree on the crucial details of the election, the deci­
sion is made by the moderator and not by the AAA. In practice, the 
moderator sits down with the parties to the election in an effort to 
mediate their differences. If mediation fails, the moderator simply 
decides when and where the election will occur.29 The moderator 
may also be called upon to declare when electioneering shall cease; to 
set the date of the runoff election, if any; and perhaps most impor­
tant, to determine eligibility to vote. In a close election, eligibility 
decisions are crucial and may well determine the outcome.30 A mod­
erator of elections makes the kinds of eligibility decisions which 
would be made by the NLRB or the State Board of Labor Relations. 
There are some clear benefits to this system, as well as some 
problems. The benefits are obvious: the process is fast and inexpen­
sive. The parties can raise objections as the ballots are being placed 
on the table for counting. The moderator can hold a mini-hearing on 
the spot, review the statutory definition of the bargaining unit, and 
make a decision on the eligibility of the voter. Occasionally, the 
moderator will know in advance of a difficult eligibility issue and re­
quest written briefs. Because the decision of the moderator is final, 
and because a particular eligibility decision usually will not affect the 
outcome of the election, the parties do not try to delay bargaining by 
appealing the decision. 
Problems with the system are also obvious. First, not all mod-
apply these rules insofar as they relate to his powers and duties.... The Elec­
tion Arbitrator shall rule on all challenged ballots and on any other objection to 
the election, and shall certify the results of the election in writing. 
Submitting to the moderator for decision such questions as eligibility of voters is clearly 
consistent with the legislative purpose. The 1965 Act required the parties to submit any 
eligibility dispute to arbitration. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 100153c (1975) (current ver­
sion at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153c (1977». But the Act was unwieldy-it called for 
each party to appoint its arbitrator. The board of education could appoint one or two, 
each teachers' organization could appoint one, and those four would pick the "impartial 
member." It does not take five arbitrators to decide a question of who may '·ote. Wisely, 
the AM never invoked this procedure. Instead, the AM solved the problem by requir­
ing the parties to agree to a single election moderator with broad powers over the con­
duct of the election. 
29. The relative strength of the rival teacher organizations frequentl)· "aries among 
schools, so the question of where the teachers vote is regarded by the organizations as 
crucial. Mail ballots have never been favored in teacher elections in Connecticut. 
30. Some elections have been extremely close. In the Dec. 3, 1975, New London 
election neither organization won a majority of ballots cast, so a runoff was necessary, 
under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153b(d) (1977». The ultimate winner trailed in the regular election. yet won the 
runoff election by one vote, 147-146. This was the second time the New London elec­
tion had gone to a runoff. Where the vote is so close, the eligibility of pemlanent substi­
tutes to vote could determine the outcome. 
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erators may agree on an eligibility question. Thus, the system may 
not operate uniformly. Second, the moderator's decision may be 
wrong, but the only appeal is, "wait until next year."31 Third, the 
moderator's decision on eligibility to vote may have an impact months 
later at the bargaining table. 
For example, a question arose in one town32 over whether de­
partment heads could vote. In the past, department heads had been 
part of the teachers' unit; they spent the majority of their time teach­
ing. They performed administrative functions but they were not re­
quired to hold an administrative certificate. Then the local board of 
education changed its policy and required department heads to hold 
administrative certificates. By so doing, did the board remove them 
from the teachers' unit and place them in the administrators' unit? 
The two units were not the same, nor were the benefits the same; 
the question had practical importance to the individuals and the 
school system. The issue was raised during an election. It waS re­
solved by a moderator, based in part upon the apparent wishes of the 
majority of department heads and upon the wording of the Act. He 
ruled they were not eligible to vote in the teachers' election, and as a 
result, the department heads moved to the administrators' unit. 33 
The moderator created the precedent which the parties then used to 
resolve a bargaining issue. 
Another example of a moderator's decision on eligibility which 
had an impact beyond the election itself involved the town of 
Wethersfield. A question arose over whether certain substitute 
teachers were eligible to vote. The Act excludes, but does not define, 
"temporary substitutes."34 Is a teacher who is hired in January to 
31. Under the AAA agreement, see note 28 supra, the moderator's decision is final 
and binding. The moderator is, in effect, an arbitrator. Under both the 1965 Act and thl' 
1976 Amendments, eligibility questions are to be resolved through arbitration. CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 1O-153c (1977). The statute contemplates a panel of arbitrators; the AAA 
agreement only requires one. In either case, the moderator-arbitrator is deciding a 
statutory issue, namely, who is included as a part of the bargaining unit under CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(a}(2} (1977). Because none of the decisions on eligibility issues 
are published, or even issued in writing, how the moderators are deciding eligibility 
issues is known only by the teacher organizations and the AAA. 
32. The discussion in the text is based on cases in which the author was II pllrticl­
pant. The names of the towns are protected by the privacy of IIrbitration. 
33. Whether this decision was proper is not material here. The point is, simply, thllt 
election moderators are deciding eligibility issues which have an impllct fllr beyond the 
election itself. After the 1976 Amendment to the 1965 Act, II teachers' organizlltlon 
could have presented the same question to the State Lllbor BOllrd by chllrging the BOllfd 
of Education with refusing to bargain. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153e(b}(5}, (e) (1977). 
34. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(b} (1977). 
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replace another teacher on indefinite sick leave a "temporary substi­
tute?" What about a teacher hired in September to replace a teacher 
on pregnancy leave? Or a teacher who is hired to be on standby each 
day, and works as a substitute virtually every school day for several 
years? Should these kinds of issues be resolved by moderators? The 
question is statutory in nature: what did the General Assembly intend 
when it defined the teacher bargaining unit?35 Before the 1976 
Amendments, the only other tribunal available to resolve such dis­
putes was the courts, and neither labor nor management appeared 
eager to challenge a moderator's decision. So far as is known, the 
eligibility decisions of the moderators, while sometimes the subject of 
grumbling by teacher organizations or boards of education, were not 
appealed to the courts. Yet, moderators at virtually every election 
were called upon to make difficult eligibility decisions. 
Another election problem under the 1965 Act was purely me­
chanical: the statute did not provide for much time to conduct both 
the main election and any required runoff election.36 The 1965 Act 
created a short election season, corresponding to the start of 
35. The teacher bargaining unit is defined at CONN. GE.~. STAT. ~ 10-153b{a)12) 
(1977). 
36. Once a petition requesting an election was filed, the election had to occur within 
20 and 45 days. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version at Co:.os. GEN. 
STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1977». The Act, in the same section, pro\·ided for a runoff election, 
but did not say when the runoff was to be held. Out of fear that a court might rule that 
the runoff had to occur within 45 days following the filing of the petition, the mod­
erators scheduled the elections during the 45-day period. This fear was not unfounded. 
The election section of the 1965 Act had been construed with rigidity in Bristol Fed·n 
of Teachers v. Sanders, No. 179975 (Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 1973). The 1965 Act pro\·ided 
for an election, with certification of the organization recciving a majority of the votes 
cast. The most reasonable interpretation of this provision would permit a runoff election 
in the event that the votes for "neither" organization prevented either organization from 
winning a clear majority. Nevertheless, Judge Parskey ruled that because the statute 
mentioned one election, it only allowed one election; if neither side won, there could 
be no runoff. As a result of this decision, the organization that won a plUrality of votes 
in the election, and a majority in the runoff, was denied bargaining rights. And the 
organization that trailed after the election and lost the runoff continued on as the bar­
gaining representative. The court did not mention the underlying purpose of the Act. 
namely, to provide an orderly procedure for teachers to choose their bargaining rep­
resentative. The legislature overturned this decision (1973 Conn. Pub. Acts 73-3851, but 
the case illustrates an unfortunate rigid view of statutory construction and a willingness 
to impose an unfair, impractical, and irrational procedure upon the parties. It also places 
the blame on the legislature: "[I]f the failure to provide for a run-off produces an 
anomalous result then resort should be had to the legislature for remedial action, not to 
the courts." Id. at 3. This is wrong. The courts ought not abdicate their responsibility to 
interpret statutes in a manner that is consistent with the statute's purpose. Now that the 
State Board of Labor Relations has jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice sections of 
the 1976 Amendments, perhaps the Act will be more liberally construed. 
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Connecticut's winters.37 Because the AAA conducted virtually all 
elections, they frequently were forced by the tight statutory time 
limits to schedule runoff elections on the same day as regular elec­
tions elsewhere, overstraining their resources. In addition, the Con­
necticut weather frequently forced last minute cancellations of elec­
tions. 
The 1965 Act did not contain a "contract bar"; and the State 
Department of Education did not read one into the Act. This meant 
that an incumbent union could sign a three-y'ear contract, and the 
very next year face an election. Even though two years remained 
before its expiration, the contract did not bar the election. A three­
year contract did not guarantee three years of labor stability. This 
rule, which differed from the National Labor Relations Board rule,3s 
encouraged annual elections. 
Moreover, under the state practice, if the challenging union won 
in the middle of the contract term, as happened in several towns, the 
victorious union and the board of education had to face the question 
of what to do with the contract. As could be expected, when this 
scenario occurred, the newly certified union asked to tear up the old 
contract, and the board resisted. Because there was no administrative 
agency to turn to, the issue was resolved by the Connecticut Superior 
Court, which ruled that the old contract remained in effect until it 
expired,39 a result which is contrary to the rule under the National 
Labor Relations Act.40 
III. CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS UNDER 1976 ACT AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS 

The 1976 Amendments did not change the definition of the bar­
gaining unit, and it left the election mechanism virtually intact. The 
opposing teachers' organizations decide who is to conduct the elec­
37. The season to petition for elections opened on October 1 and closed on 
November 30. The season to vote opened 20 days after the first petition and closed 45 
days after the last petition. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1975) (current version 
at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1977». Many elections had to be scheduled around 
the holidays. 
38. See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123,51 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1962). 
39. Waterford Fed'n of Teachers v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., No. 043553 (Super. Ct. 
Nov. 12, 1974). At the time of the decision, the statute contained no contract bar. Con­
sequently, teachers could change bargaining representatives immediately after the sign­
ing of a new contract. The court ruled that the new bargaining agent inherits the old 
collective bargaining contract. 
40. See Ludlow Typograph Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 724, 36 L.R.R.M. 1364 (1955); Ameri­
can Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 32 L.R.R.M. 1439 (1953). 
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tion,41 which as a practical matter means that the elections will con­
tinue to be conducted by the AAA. Moderators will continue to make 
crucial decisions concerning elections, including eligibility. The elec­
tion season was moved from winter to early spring,42 and the time 
limits were eased to allow ten days for runoffs. 43 The cost of the 
elections was shifted from the boards of education to the teacher 
organizations.44 And the boards are no longer party to election 
ground rules or to the agreement with the AAA appointing the mod­
erator, which may raise some unforeseen practical problems. 
Previously, when representatives of the school administration at­
tended the ground rule meetings, the moderator would obtain their 
written consent to provide lists of eligible voters. Now, these rep­
resentatives no longer attend the meetings; nor are they parties to 
the agreement appointing the moderator. Previously, whatever power 
the moderators had over the boards originated from the board's 
agreement with the AAA. While no board has flatly refused to fur­
nish eligibility lists, disputes have arisen over the timing and cost of 
compiling such lists. If persuasion fails to resolve such disputes, the 
moderator can no longer order a resolution. And should a board of 
education ever fail to produce the eligibility list, the moderator is 
powerless to act. 
The moderator's powers are limited in other ways. Consider the 
problem of campaign electioneering. Frequently, the ground rules 
which the parties either agree to, or which the parties are forced to 
adhere to by decision of the moderator, provide for an end to elec­
tioneering on the day before the voting. If one organization accuses 
the other of passing out election material or stuffing teachers' mail 
boxes on the day of election, there is little the moderator can do. Or, 
if one organization accuses the other of passing out false or misleading 
material, in theory, perhaps, the moderator can declare an election 
void, but that has never been done, and the moderator's power to do 
so has not been tested.45 
41. Local boards of education no longer contract with the agency conducting the 
election. Section 10-153b(d), after the 1976 Amendments now omits the words "town or 
regional board" from the same section of the 1965 Act. As a result. the town or regional 
board is no longer a party to the agreement appointing the election agency. CoNN. GEo.... 
STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1977). 
42. The petitioning season opens up March I and dose~ on April 30. The election 
season remains from 20 to 45 days thereafter. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1977). 
43. ld. 
44. ld. 
45. The Act requires the election to be held on or before the forty-fifth d.l), following 
the petition. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(d) (1977). If the election were held on the 
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If either teacher organization accuses the administration of favor­
ing the rival organization by giving it advantages not given to the 
other, the moderator is again powerless to act effectively. School 
buildings are within the control of the administration, not the mod­
erator. If a principal decides to bar organizers from the outside 
union, while allowing representatives of the incumbent union to 
enter the schools to discuss grievances, the moderator cannot re­
spond. The administration is beyond the moderator's jurisdiction be­
cause the administration no longer signs the agreement with the AAA 
requiring the use of the moderator to resolve election disputes. 
The moderators in Connecticut thus perform the same function 
as the National Labor Relations Board in conducting elections, except 
that the National Labor Relations Board has the power effectively to 
police election abuse. The moderators lack that power. 
Now that the State Board of Labor Relations has jurisdiction over 
unfair labor practices in education,46 the Labor Board's decisions and 
the decisions of the moderators as to which teachers are a part of the 
bargaining unit may conflict. Assume one organization questions the 
eligibility of teacher X, a substitute, to vote. A moderator's decision 
that teacher X may vote leaves the question of whether the board of 
education must bargain over the salary of teacher X unresolved. Just 
because the moderator allowed teacher X to vote is no guarantee that 
the board of education will acquiesce and permit the union to bargain 
on behalf of that teacher. Thus, if the board of education resists, a 
second hearing before the State Board of Labor Relations over 
whether the teacher may be part of the unit is required. 
In a recent election in Wethersfield, the moderator ruled that a 
long-term substitute who was asked to be on call every school day, 
and who taught as a substitute virtually every school day, and who 
had been doing so for several years, was eligible to vote. This deci­
sion did not bind the board of education because it was not a party to 
the AAA agreement appointing the moderator, and because the mod­
erator had no power to determine the unit for purposes of bargaining. 
At the time of the election the question of whether this substitute 
was part of the bargaining unit was pending before the State Board of 
Labor Relations on a refusal to bargain charge. Following the elec­
tion, the Labor Board's decision came down in favor of the teacher.47 
last day, and if the moderator were to void the election because of a ground rule viola­
tion, when could the next election be held? 
46. See note 122 infra and accompanying text. 
47. Wethersfield Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1560 (July 26, 
1977). 
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The board of education had to bargain over her salary. 
In the Wethersfield case the State Labor Board and the mod­
erator agreed. But what if they had reached conflicting results? What 
if the moderator had ruled her eligible, the election had been won by 
one vote, and thereafter the State Labor Board had ruled that she 
was not part of the bargaining unit? Or, what if a moderator were to 
rule that five substitutes were eligible to vote because their employ­
ment, while perhaps lasting only a few months, was of indefinite du­
ration, and the election is won by four votes? Assume that the Labor 
Board later determines that the board of education need not bargain 
over these employees because they are not within the bargaining 
unit. What then? Is the election void? 
Clearly the decisions ought to be the same in both cases, but 
under the present system they may very well be different. The po­
tential for disagreement between the moderator and the Labor Board 
is always present. Some of these issues are close questions, ,md to 
have the moderators deciding them during elections, and the Labor 
Board afterwards, duplicates effort and may lead to inconsistent re­
sults. 
For the above reasons, the Act should be amended to place the 
duty of conducting elections before the State Board of Labor Rela­
tions, where questions of eligibility, access to schools, and alleged 
false and misleading campaign materials may be resolved in a manner 
that is consistent from school system to school system. The State 
Labor Board already conducts elections among other public em­
ployees,48 including other employees of boards of education;49 add­
ing teacher elections would simply conform to the pattern. 
The 1976 Amendments added a contract bar rule50 which oper­
ates to prevent elections during the first two years of any multiple­
year contract. If a contract is for three years, an election may take 
place during the third year, 51 but even if the rival organization wins, 
the statute provides that the old contract terms remain in effect.52 
48. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-471 (1977). 
49. See note 151 infra. 
50. "Whenever a multiple year contract is in effect. no representative election ~h.1I1 
be held until two years of such contract have elapsed or until less than one year n .... 
mains prior to the expiration date of such contract, whichever is ~ooner." Coss. CE.... 
STAT. § 10-153b(e) (1977). 
51. Id. 
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153b(e) (1977) pro\'ides in part: "The tenll~ of ,til)' exist­
ing contract shall not be abrogated by the election or deSignation of a new representa­
tive." The rule in the private sector is the opposite. See note 40 SIIIJrU and ,ICCOmpan)'­
ing text. 
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The only drawback of the rule is the possibility, although a remote 
one, that the incumbent may sign a contract with a duration of five 
years or more and thereby bind the teachers to an agreement which 
if signed in the private sector could be challenged after the third 
year. 53 
IV. IMPASSE RESOLUTION: THE 1965 ACT 
Under the 1965 Act contracts between boards of education and 
teacher organizations were subject to town nullification, either by the 
town council or (depending upon local law) the town meeting, or 
even by referendum. 54 And while the fiscal authority had the final 
word over the contract, that authority was not involved in the actual 
bargaining. All too frequently, after months and months of bargain­
ing, the parties would finally reach an agreement, only to see it 
thrown out by the town council55 or voters. 56 While the power to 
53. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
54. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153d (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153d (1977» providing in part: 
The terms of such contract shall be binding on the legislative body of the town 
or regional school district, unless such body rejects such contract at a regular or 
special meeting called for such purpose within thirty days of the filing of the 
contract. Any regional board of education shall call a district meeting to con­
sider such contract within such thirty-day period if the chief executive officer of 
any member town so requests in writing within fifteen days of the receipt of 
the signed copy of the contract by the town clerk in such town. . . . If the 
legislative body rejects such contract within such period, the parties shall re­
negotiate the term~ of the contract in accordance with the procedure in this 
section. 
55. The New York Times reported the events leading up to the 1976 Meriden 
teacher strike as follows: 
As this city's 580 striking teachers marched on picket lines for the sixth day 
today, some said they felt they were pawns in a complex game of power politics 
that did not concern them. 
The teachers went on strike April 7 after the city's Court of Common Council 
twice rejected a two-year contract, approved by the Board of Education, that 
called for a wage increase of 2.4 percent. 
The Meriden Federation of Teachers later agreed to a settlement of a total of 
$25 less for the two years, which was accepted by the Common Council, the 
legislative body in this industrial city south of Hartford. 
But late Saturday night, in a special session that ended only 10 minutes bl~ 
fore midnight, when the settlement would have become irrevocable by law, the 
Common Council rejected the plan again. 
Mayor Grossman declined to talk about the strike. 
Other city officials said the underlying dispute in the strike was a disagree­
ment between the Common Council and the Board of Education over the 
amount and disposition of surplus school funds. 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1976, at 37, col. 3. 
56. For example, in 1976, the contract between the Cromwell Education Associntloll 
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nullify was used with some responsibility in many towns, others saw 
repeated taxpayer rejections of even modest contracts. For example, 
in Regional District #16, the teachers tried four times to reach an 
agreement with the town, finally succeeding after three arbitration 
sessions and months of negotiations. 57 
Bargaining under the 1965 Act was conducted against no real 
deadline. Negotiations frequently began in November and lasted until 
the following October or later. This meant that the municipal budget 
had to be set before the contract was settled. Once the budget was 
firm, it became politically difficult for boards to settle for anything 
more than what was in the budget. Strikes were illegal,58 but a part 
of the landscape. 
If negotiations failed, the 1965 Act required the parties to 
negotiate with the aid of a state-appointed mediator. 59 If the mediator 
was unable to assist the parties in coming to an agreement, the Act 
called for mandatory arbitration-but the arbitration award was not 
binding. The parties could-and frequently did-reject the award. 
Once these impasse procedures had run their course, and failed, and 
the teachers went on strike, the statute did not give the State Board 
of Education clear authority to intervene through mediation.6o In 
fact, if arbitration failed, the statute did not appear to require any 
further proceedings whatsoever.61 In practice, however, most boards 
of education and teacher organizations consented to a second round of 
mediation, followed by a second round of nonbinding arbitration. 
Mediators under the 1965 Act were appointed by the Secretary 
to the State Board of Education. While the parties had no direct 
control over who mediated their dispute, if the parties preferred a 
particular mediator their wishes were usually granted. None of the 
mediators served full time, none received formal training,62 and their 
and the Cromwell Board of Education was rejected by referendum. The Hartford Cour­
ant, Feb. 7, 1976, at 6, col. 1. 
57. See The Hartford Courant, May 9, 1977, at 17, col. 1. 
58. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1975) (current version at COl':l':. GEl':. STAT. 
§ 10-153e (1977». 
59. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current version at CO:,"!,:. GES. STAT. 
§ 10-153f (1977». 
60. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at Coss. GE.... STAT. 
§ 10-153d (1977) required more negotiations if the fiscal authority rejected a contract. 
But if the board and teacher organization could not reach agreement, even after adVisory 
arbitration, the statute contained no clear guidance. In practice, the parties usually went 
back into negotiations, sometimes with reluctance. 
61. ld. 
62. According to the Secretary, the State Department of Education intends to gh'e all 
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effectiveness varied. 
Arbitration under the 1965 Act was conducted before either a 
panel of three arbitrators or a single arbitrator-the parties could 
choose. 63 If the parties desired three arbitrators, each side would ap­
point an advocate arbitrator, who would in tum select a neutral third 
arbitrator. If the advocate arbitrators could not agree upon a neutral 
arbitrator, the Secretary appointed the neutral from a panel. 64 Mem­
bers of this panel were all chosen by the Governor.65 They appar­
ently were not screened for neutrality.66 Some panel members were 
regarded as unacceptable by either the teacher organizations or 
boards of education. With a change in governors, some panel mem­
bers were not reappointed, including some with established reputn­
tions for neutrality. 
V. IMPASSE RESOLUTION: THE 1976 AMENDMENTS 
A bill to require final and binding arbitration of all teacher dis­
putes failed in 1975.67 The 1976 Act as introduced contained a form 
of final offer arbitration,68 but the provision was dropped as the bill 
mediators formal training through a program with the Federal Mediation and Concilia­
tion Service and the AAA. 
63. "Unless the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to one arbitrator, their 
designated arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator." CONN. GEN. STAT. ~ 1O-153f(c) 
(1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(c) (1977». 
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(c) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153f(c) (1977». According to the same section of the statute, if a party failed to 
appoint its arbitrator, the Secretary would appoint that arbitrator, too. 
65. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153f(a) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
~ 1O-153f(a) (1977». 
66. The AAA will not place anyone on its labor panels who concurrently represents 
participants in labor disputes. A person who makes a living representing either labor 
or management while at the same time serving as a neutral arbitrator will, regardless 
of actual integrity and fairness, be perceived as biased. Governor Grasso did appoint 
to the governor's panel a person who represents participants in labor disputes. This is 
most unfortunate, for if advocates for labor or managment appear on the panel, either 
of two things will happen: the panel will be challenged in court because the third 
arbitrator is not impartial; or the process will not be taken seriously by those who arc 
intended to be served, and instead of resolving disputes, the panel of arbitrators will 
simply alienate the parties and eventually the public. The arbitration panel has only the 
power to persuade. Its recommendations are not binding. Therefore, it is of utmost im­
portance that the impartial arbitrator not be chosen from the active labor relations bar. 
67. An Act Concerning School Board-Teacher Negotiations, Comm. Bill No. 5625, 
LCO No. 7276 (1975). 
68. An Act Concerning School Board-Teacher Negotiations, H.B. No. 5117, LCO No. 
719 (1976). Under this proposal the arbitrators would decide the dispute iss lie by issue, 
choosing between the final position of either party. The theory behind the proposal is 
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neared passage. The impasse procedures in the final bill remain es­
sentially the same as under the 1965 Act, with some clumges in de­
tails. For example, the new amendments69 attempt to provide a dead­
line for negotiations: bargaining must begin 180 days in advimce of 
the budget submission date,70 which may vary from town to town. In 
addition, to lessen the chances of town nullification, the 1976 Amend­
ments require communication between the fiscal authority and the 
board of education before bargaining. 71 
In theory, the new system was designed to require agreement 
before the budget was set,72 and to lessen the chance of rejection by 
the municipality's fiscal authority by including it in the bargaining 
process.73 However, fiscal authorities continue to reject teacher con­
tracts. In Berlin, for example, a ta.xpayer group successfully fought 
two teacher contracts by forcing a referendum, causing a job action 
by the teachers, which in tum led the ta.xpayer group to launch a 
third referendum against a contract calling for a four and one-half 
percent salary increase. 74 The new amendments cannot change the 
fact that the real political power may lie outside of the finance com­
mittee or the city council and may be lodged with some other politi­
cal figure, or with the voters, or even with the political parties. Long, 
obvious: each party trying to win in arbitration would present modemte propos,lls, .1IId 
in the process, move toward the other. 
69. 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts 76-403 (amending CONN. GEN. ST.o\T. §§ l()'l53a to 153g 
(1975». 
70. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1()'153d(b) (1977). 
71. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1()'153d(a) (1977) requires the fiscal authority, u.loually the 
board of finance or the board of selectmen, and the board of eduC'J.tion to "meet and 
confer" with each other. This used to be the practice in some communities; now it is 
mandatory. The same section of the new Act also allows, but does not appear to require, 
the fiscal authority "to be present during negotiations" and to "pro\'ide such fiscoll in· 
formation as may be requested by the board of education." 
72. If after 90 days of negotiations, the parties cannot agree, the Act requires them to 
commence arbitration. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1()'153f(c)(l) (1977). The chairperson of the 
arbitration panel is supposed to set the first hearing within 13 days of appointment. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1()'153f(c)(2) (1977). The hearings are to be concluded within 20 
days, and the report of the arbitrators must be issued within 15 days of the date the 
hearing is closed. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10·153f(c)(3), (4) (1977). \\1lere the p.u1ies sub­
mit 70 issues to the arbitrators, these time limits become impossible. In pmctice, they 
are regularly ignored. 
73. CO!l.'N. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d(a) (1977). The fisc,ll authority has the right to be 
"present during negotiations." This probably means that the person so designated is not 
a voting member of the negotiation team of the board of education. From the wording of 
the Act, it would appear that the board of education cannot force that person's presence 
but the fiscal authority can. 
74. The Hartford Courant, May 9, 1977, at 16, col. 1. 
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drawn-out negotiations still occur. 75 
In the opinion of some, the new law has not had much impact on 
the way the various participants in the negotiation process behave. 
But with the new deadlines, the arbitration season has been 
lengthened. 76 
75. Consider, for example, the negotiation history of the 1977-78 contract in North 
Branford: 
September 21, 1976 
October 12, 1976 
October 13, 










December 14, 1976 











Aug. 2, 1977 
NEGOTIATIONS CHRONOLOGY 














Board of Education Budget 
Hearing with Town Coun­
cil 
Negotiations 
Public Budget Hearing 
Negotiations 
Negotiations 
Budget Hearing with Town 
Council 






This information is taken from the brief submitted by the Branford Board of Education 
to the Board of Arbitrators. The author served as the neutral arbitrator on this panel. 
As of August 15, 1977, the parties had not yet reached agreement, although tht, 
budget for the 1977-78 fiscal year had been fixed for some time. 
76. Because only a few engage in teacher-board arbitration sessions as advocatl's, 
and fewer still as arbitrators, arranging mutually convenient hearing dates is frequently 
difficult. Spreading the arbitrations over more months has eased the problem. 
561 1977) 1976 A.\fE~D.\fE.\'TS TO TIlE T.\'..\ 
The 1976 Amendments give to the Secretary to the State Board 
of Education the power to appoint arbitrators from the governor's 
panel or from any other panel.77 The obvious purpose was to blunt 
the criticism directed at the arbitrators, and to insulate their selection 
from the political process. How the Secretary chooses to exercise this 
new power is crucial. The number of arbitrators acting in this field is 
quite small. Presently, the Secretary continues to make single ap­
pointments if the parties cannot agree. The AAA, on the other hand, 
provides the parties with lists of five or seven names, and appoints a 
single arbitrator only after the parties repeatedly fail to make a selec­
tion from the lists. The AAA system gives the parties greater control 
over the selection of the arbitrator. On the other hand, the system 
used by the Secretary only comes into play if the parties C'.lnnot agree 
among themselves on the neutral arbitrator.78 
Under the 1965 Act, mediators were hired and paid by the State 
Department of Education. 79 Under the 1976 Amendments, the 
mediators are chosen by the parties from a state list,80 and are paid 
by the parties.81 This practice is a departure from the federal pattern. 
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service provides mediators, 
paid by the government, to parties in the private sector.82 The Con­
necticut Department of Labor maintains several full-time mediators. 
who are used in the private and public sectors without cost to the 
parties.83 The practice of maintaining full-time mediators appears 
superior to the present system used in education. All of the 
77. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(c)(I) (1977). By implication, this section allows 
the Secretary to create another panel of arbitrators, or to use arbitrators from the AAA 
panel. Appointments need no longer be from the governor's panel. 
78. Knowing that the Secretary will appoint a single arbitrator may, In some cases, 
inspire the parties to choose a neutral arbitrator. 
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(b) (1975) (current version at CoNN. GE.~. STAT. 
§ 10-153f(b) (1977». 
80. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(b) (1977). This section also allows the partie~ to 
choose the mediator from "any other panel of qualified mediators." The ~.lnle ~ectioll 
also authorizes the Secretary to deSignate a mediator. 
8!. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(b) (1977). Despite the language in till' .Ibove ~t.lt­
ute, not all teacher mediators are paid by the parties. In the event of a strike. the Se~ 
retary may send in an intervenor, who performs a mediation function. but who is not 
paid by the parties. In a strike, one side or the other or both may not enter mlodiation 
with much enthusiasm. To require that they pay for the peacemakl'r liMy han' 
psychological disadvantages, and handicap the mediator. The statute should probably be 
amended so that the state provides the mediator as a service to the public. To do ~o 
would conform to the practice of federal and Connecticut mediation wrvit'e\. 
82. W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BAI\CAININC 34. 
55-57 (1971). 
83. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-472,31-96. -99 (1977). 
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mediators used in educational disputes have other, full-time jobs. In 
the event of a strike, the Secretary must run through the list to de­
termine who, if anyone, is available. 84 The state might do better with 
a full-time mediator in education. Recognizing some of these prob­
lems, the Department of Education has begun to implement a formal 
system for training its part-time mediators, a valuable step. 
Both the 1976 Amendments85 and the 1965 Act8S allow the par­
ties to choose between a single arbitrator and a tripartite arbitration 
panel to conduct the advisory arbitration. In practice, the overwhelm­
ing majority of deadlocks have been referred to tripartite panels com­
prised of one arbitrator chosen by the board of education, one by the 
teacher organization, and a third arbitrator chosen either by the other 
two arbitrators or by the Secretary to the State Board of Education. 
The chairperson of the arbitration panel is impartial; the other two 
are advocate arbitrators. 87 
VI. IMPASSE RESOLUTION: THE NATURE OF ARBITRATION 
Arbitration under the Connecticut statute may not be fully un­
derstood by the public. The process is called arbitration by the 
statute,88 but that does not mean that the process is as judicial in 
nature as the arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim, or the arbi­
tration of a breach of contract claim. Following a recent arbitration, an 
advocate arbitrator came under public criticism for having contacted 
84. On occasion, none of the mediators has been available, at least not immediately. 
85. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(c)(1) (1977). 
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(c) (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153f(c)(1) (1977». 
87. Before 1969, § 10-153f(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes spoke of "an Im­
partial board of three arbitrators." Although the Act also stated that each party was to 
appoint an arbitrator, who would then join in selecting the third, and despite the fact 
that such tripartite boards are commonly used in labor arbitration with no one expecting 
anyone but the neutral arbitrator to be truly neutral, a superior court ruled in 1968 that 
all three arbitrators should be neutral because, thought the court, without citing any 
authority whatsoever, "An advisory decision by three impartial arbitrators is more help­
ful and beneficial to the public than a decision by a board containing just one Impartial 
arbitrator." West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. West Hartford Bd. of Educ., 27 Conn. Supp. 
421, 427, 241 A.2d 780, 783 (Super. Ct. 1968). The judge failed to understand that ad­
visory arbitration is one step in the negotiation process, one more method of placing 
pressure on both sides to settle. It contains elements of both arbitration and negotiation. 
The above decision, if allowed to stand, would have removed the element of negotia­
tion from the arbitration process. In 1969, the legislature overturned this decision by 
removing the reference to "an impartial board of three arbitrators," making it clear that 
the parties may appoint advocate arbitrators to the panel. 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 811 
(codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153f(c) (1977». The current Act simply refers to the 
three arbitrators as the "panel." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153f(c)(1), (2) (1977). 
88. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1977). 
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during the deliberations the party who appointed him. In ordinary 
arbitration, such contact would not be proper, but in "interest arbi­
tration" as practiced in Connecticut under the Teacher Negotiation 
Act, such contact is common, and may be invaluable. 
What are these three arbitrators supposed to be doing? Are they 
negotiators pure and simple, creatures and extensions of the parties 
who appointed them, with the neutral arbitrator there to serve as a 
mediator? Or are they independent, answering only to a personal 
sense of what is "fair"? In answering these questions, it should be 
kept in mind that the arbitration awards are not binding.89 Either 
side may reject even a unanimous award. Rejection me~ms f.'lilure, 
continued negotiations, heightened tensions, possible job actions, and 
perhaps even a teacher strike. However, a unanimous award does 
create public pressure for settlement which may be otherwise absent. 
A party that rejects a unanimous award is, in effect, rejecting the 
recommendations of its own representatives on the arbitration panel. 
The other side of the dispute can argue to the public, in effect, 
"Their own arbitrator thought this settlement was reasonable--why 
don't they?"90 
Thus, although the arbitrators are appointed because bargaining 
has failed, the process of arbitrating the terms of a new contract is an 
extension of the bargaining process itself. Teacher organiz.'ltions and 
boards of education recognize this fact in the careful way they select 
their advocate arbitrators.91 Does this mean that the party arbitrators 
are simply extensions of the parties? Do they have any indepen­
dence? In theory, they are independent; in practice, they are as in­
dependent as the individuals playing those roles choose. Because the 
award is not binding, "independent" advocate arbitrators may be 
more willing to agree to a settlement which is less (if from labor) or 
more (if from management) than their side may have liked. Because 
the arbitrator's decision is not binding, an advocate arbitrator has 
more independence than a party negotiator (i.e., the person doing 
the actual collective bargaining for the party), who goes beyond in­
structions at considerable peril. 
89. uThe decision of the arbitrators or the single arbitmtor shall be .ltI\'I~ory .mtl 
shall not be binding upon the parties to the dispute." Cmm. CES. STAT. § 10-153f(cIH) 
(1977). 
90. This, in a nutshell, is why hvo advocate arbitrators plu~ one nelltr.1l .lfe ,uperior 
to three neutral arbitrators in advisory arbitration over te.wher l"Ontr.lch. 
91. In many cases, the advocate arbitrators are more important to tht' Jlroce,~ th.1Il 
the neutral. Unless all three agree, the award may be wortllle~~. and lI,ually .Igreement 
is only possible through compromise. 
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Thus, the advocate arbitrators are of crucial importance. In fact, 
their participation in the arbitration of new contracts is sufficiently 
valuable to warrant amending the statute so as to make the tripartite 
panel mandatory. Several factors support such an amendment. First, 
because the result is nonbinding, the award of a single arbitrator 
often carries no practical weight whatsoever. Second, in the event of 
a conflict between what is "fair and equitable" and what is "possible," 
however those terms may be defined, the advocate arbitrators are 
indispensable. They may have a much better "feel" of the situation 
than the neutral. They may be able to determine which of the issues 
are important, which crucial, and which interesting but not signifi­
cant. Frequently, what to the neutral may appear significant may not 
be so to the parties, and at times the issue that most divides the 
parties may not appear to be of much importance to an outsider. 
Third, the advocate arbitrators enable each party to have its position 
argued yet another time. In a complicated arbitration, no matter how 
ably presented, questions frequently arise about certain facts or evi­
dence. Having two persons responsible not only to the parties but to 
the process of resolving the dispute makes it all the more probable 
that all points will be thoroughly debated and considered. Thus, the 
quality of the work and the value of the arbitration award would be 
significantly enhanced by requiring tripartite arbitration panels to 
hear disputes over new contract terms. 92 
Because the arbitration process is both an extension of the bar­
gaining process and a hearing before two semi-independent souls and 
one fully neutral member, the party negotiators presenting arguments 
to the arbitration panel may be tempted to under-present their case, 
and rely instead upon the negotiation skills of their advocate arbi­
trator. In other words, party negotiators may choose to have the "real" 
negotiation done in the arbitration setting rather than at the collec­
tive bargaining table. When the parties bring seventy or eighty issues 
to the arbitrators, as has happened, something has gone seriously 
awry during bargaining. One or both sides has been unreasonably 
stubborn, or, because of internal dissension, has been unable to unite 
behind a bargaining position and is solving the problem by allowing 
each point of view to be expressed at the arbitration hearing. There 
may be no solution to this problem. Limit the number of issues that 
may be arbitrated, and you may encourage the parties to refuse to 
bargain effectively on any more than the "magic number." Fail to 
92. Grievance arbitration is a different institution with dilTerent assumptions, prot'l" 
dUTes, and purposes. The discussion in the text is limited to "inten'st" arbitration. 
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limit the number, and you invite four days of hearings concerning 
eighty issues. Bringing a multitude of issues before the arbitrators 
increases the probability that the arbitrators will disagree among 
themselves, and guarantees that the cost of the arbitration process 
will rise. 
There are no statutory standards for teacher contract arbitration 
in Connecticut. Neither the old statute nor the 1976 Amendments 
dictates standards to guide the arbitrators,93 but the absence of 
statutory standards makes little practical difference. The types of 
standards used in interests arbitration are well known.94 The basic 
notion is comparison. Whether a teacher is worth X dollars or Y dol­
lars depends upon a comparison with what others are making at the 
same time--other teachers in the area, in comparable towns in Con­
necticut, and in the region. Wages in other fields are also cited with 
frequency. The cost of living is argued about as often as the town's 
ability to pay. Applying these standards is frequently difficult, but 
when they absolutely conflict, as happens when a town must layoff 
93. A 1975 bill, introduced but never passed, contained five standards to guide the 
arbitrators, whose decision was, under the bill, final and binding. Those standards were: 
(A) The recommendation of the Secretary for settlement as provided for in sub­
section (b) of this section and the bargaining between the parties prior to the 
submission of the issues to arbitration; (B) Comparison of the salaries and other 
conditions of employment of the certified professional employees invoh'ed in 
the arbitration with salaries and other conditions of employment of other em· 
ployees performing similar services in comparable communities or in comparable 
jobs in private employment; (C) The public interest and the financial ability of 
the municipality or school district to pay the cost of the arbitrators' award; (D) 
Changes in the cost of living since the last agreement between the parties on 
salary schedules; (E) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing. which 
are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of 
salaries and other conditions of employment through \'oluntary collective bar· 
gaining, mediation, fact·finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in 
the public service or in private employment. 
H.B. 5625, LCO No. 7276 (1975). 
The first bill introduced in the 1976 session on teacher bargaining, H.B. 5117, LCO 
No. 719, before it was amended, provided for the following criteria: 
In deciding each question, the panel shall take into account (A) The negotia· 
tion between the parties prior to arbitration and the recommendation of the 
Secretary .... (B) The public interest and financial capability of the school 
district; (C) The salaries. hours and other conditions of employment pre\".liling 
in the state labor market; (D) Changes in the cost of Ih'ing; and tE) TIll' in· 
terests and welfare of the certified professional employee. 
When binding arbitration was deleted from the proposed act. so were the st.lnd.lrds. 
The laws of some states include a statement of standards. Scc gCllcrallu ~lcAvo>'. 8/r1l/' 
ing Arbitration of Contract Terms: A Neu: A/J/Jroach to the Resollltiull of Dis,,"te~ il/ 
the Pllblic Sector, 72 COLU!II. L. REV. 1192 (1972). 
94. See gel/erall!l F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI. slI/Jra note 15. at 745-96. 
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teachers for lack of funds while inflation chews away at the pay of 
those who remain, arbitration is not equipped to resolve the dispute. 
It then serves merely to delay the day of the crunch, when the 
teachers either accept far less than their counterparts in more fortu­
nate towns, or engage in an illegal work stoppage. 
When an impending strike presents itself in arbitration, the 
question for the arbitrators, and especially the neutral, is how to 
react. Should the neutral be guided by the strength of the union to 
strike or by the power of the community to resist? Should bargaining 
power ever be a factor in such a situation? This writer argued to the 
contrary as chairman of the panel in the arbitration that preceded the 
New Haven teacher strike of 1975, in which teachers were bussed off 
to jail for defying an injunction. 95 The opinion, in which neither the 
union nor the management arbitrator joined, but which is a public 
document and therefore not subject to the usual rules governing con­
fidentiality of arbitrators' awards, made the following points: 
The Board and the Dissent contend, with obvious con­
viction, that we should abandon the traditional criteria for 
setting wages and recommend that there be no increases 
and no increments. They contend that the budget contains 
no funds for any increases; that any request for additional 
funds would be futile; and that the politics of the situation 
call for the first no increase, no increment adjustment since 
1936. Having no hope whatsoever for any additional infusion 
of funds, they contend that the money for any increases 
would have to come from within the existing budget, an ob­
vious impossibility, unless the Board decides to layoff hun­
dreds of teachers. Faced with a choice of massive layoffs on 
the one hand or no increments and no increases on the 
other hand, the Board and Dissent contend that the lesser 
of the two evils is no increases. They contend that massive 
layoffs will impair education, destroy morale, and hurt the 
students' education. 
The Union Arbitrator argued, with equal vigor and sin­
cerity, that New Haven will fund any additional increases 
95. Ninety teachers were held in contempt and confined at Camp Hartell in Windsor 
Locks. See New Haven Journal-Courier, Nov. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 1. On Monday, Nov. 
24, 1975, the strike was settled. According to the New Haven Journal-Courier, Nov. 24, 
1975, at 42, col. 2, "A sympathy strike by the school employees last week forced the 
closing of schools and a citywide coalition of labor unions has threatened a half-day 
strike for Tuesday if the 90 [jailed teachers] are still in jail." 
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without layoffs. And therein lies the problem of using as a 
criterion for wage determination the politics of the situation. 
Each side makes conflicting predictions as to what the City 
will or won't pay. Each side may be relying on inside infor­
mation, hunches, statements by political leaders, or news­
paper editorials. Each side gives a different reading of the 
political winds. These winds are usually strong but never 
steady. A Board wind may shift into a breeze favoring the 
teachers, and shift back again. The Chairman believes that 
the only way to discover what will or won't be accepted is to 
make an effort to arrive at a fair wage figure, using tradi­
tional wage arguments. Otherwise, the Arbitrators are re­
duced to weathervanes, being blown first this way and then 
that way as the political currents swirl around them. Were 
the Chairman to follow the implied suggestion of the Board, 
so that the will of the City to resist funding would become 
the main issue, the wage setting process would tum away 
from an inquiry into what is a fair and equitable wage in­
crease. The panel would then be asking about the will of the 
City to resist payment; and inquiring into the will of the 
teachers to wrest payment. This would lead us down a road 
that ends abruptly at the precipice of power. The Chairman 
rejects as a criterion for setting wages the argument of rela­
tive power. That one side or the other has the power to 
force capitulation does not make the exercise of that power 
right. Power does not necessarily make for a fair criterion, 
and power can be a two-edged sword. Once we concede in 
this case that New Haven has the power to offer nothing, 
then the next time we may have to concede that the Union 
has the power to force payment. Once we admit that be­
cause the City has cut the Board's budget, nothing further 
can be done, we virtually invite the use of countervailing 
power from the other side. Whether the teachers could 
force the Board to capitulate, or whether the Board has the 
power to force the teachers to capitulate, is irrelevant to this 
inquiry of what is a fair settlement. The Chairman believes 
that it is not fair for the City to be forced into paying the 
teachers' demands, nor is it fair for the City to force the 
teachers into accepting nothing.96 
96. Opinion of the Neutral Arbitrator in dispute between the City of New Haven Bd. 
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This essay into the use of power as a criterion in wage arbitra­
tion was, of course, utterly ineffective. Shortly after it was issued, 
the teachers struck. The arbitration process was, in that dispute, ir­
relevant. 
VII. IMPASSE RESOLUTION: TEACHER STRIKES 
The old act prohibited teacher strikes,97 but could not prevent 
them. 98 While continuing the prohibition against such strikes,99 the 
1976 Amendments outlaw the ex parte injunction. 100 This means as a 
of Educ. and the New Haven Fed'n of Teachers, Oct. 20, 1975 (on file in the office of 
the Commissioner of Education). 
97. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 1O-153e (1977). 
98. The reasons for teachers' strikes are varied. Perhaps some insight into the motI­
vation may be provided by the teachers themselves. Thomas P. Mondani of the Connec­
ticut Education Association explained the reasons why teachers strike in an article re­
printed in the New Haven Register, Nov. 23, 1975, at 3B, col. 5. In that article, he 
states: 
Watertown, East Haven, Cromwell, Bristol, Shelton-towns which in normal 
classifications such as population, geographic location, student population, or 
economic rankings have little in common, except that the teachers were on 
strike this year.... 
Why do teachers strike? ... 
Teachers strike because of a deep frustration with a system which refuses to 
recognize and resolve the real problems teachers continue to face. Over­
crowded classroom [sic], lack of supplies, lack of programs, inadequate griev­
ance procedures to settle disputes, salary gains severely eroded by inflation, 
[and] job insecurity due to unfair layoff procedures are among the list in nearly 
every town . 
. . . [T]eachers, realizing that they and they alone may bear tremendous per­
sonal risk since political leaders will not, that all reasonable efforts to produce 
agreements and provide solutions have failed, that no other meaningful alterna· 
tives resolve disputes [sic] are available, that they then must make the painful 
moral decision whether or not to strike. 
Others hold that teachers strike for the same reason as any other employees-"more." 
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1977). 
100. Before the 1976 Amendments, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1975), after stating 
that strikes were illegal, continued as follows: "This provision may be enforced in the 
superior court for any county in which said board of education is located by an ex parte 
temporary injunction ...." The quoted language was deleted in 1976. See CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 10-153e (1977). The new enforcement language reads: "This provision may be 
enforced in the superior court for any county in which said board of education is located 
by an injunction issued by said court or a judge thereof pursuant to sections 52-471 to 
52-479 inclusive." The legislative intent, therefore, would appear to require notice and 
hearing before a teachers' strike is enjoined. Although CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-473 
(1977) permits an ex parte injunction if "it clearly appears that irreparable loss or dam­
age will result," apparently the General Assembly found that at least the first day or two 
of a teachers' strike does not cause irreparable injury. 
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practical matter that striking teachers are not enjoined until the sec­
ond or third day of the strike, and they are not called up on con­
tempt charges until the fourth or fIfth day. The change allows the 
teachers an extra day or two until the law lands on them. Once 
teachers strike, psychology becomes more important than law. Some 
judges, recognizing this, attempt to mediate the dispute themselves, 
in their chambers,lOl all the while holding on to the power to hold 
the teachers in contempt. Other judges have taken a different tack. 
When the New Haven teachers struck in 1975, Judge Saden held 
them in contempt and jailed all of the leaders and seventy-eight of 
the strikers. 102 While the judge was certainly following the letter of 
101. Judge Hill, upon enjoining the Greenwich teachers' strike of 1976, said he 
would fine the teachers S100 and their organization SlO,OOO per day if the strike con­
tinued. He declined to jail the teachers, but said he would leave that option open, and 
offered to mediate the dispute. The parties accepted the offer, and bargained in the 
Fairfield County Superior Court Building. See The Hartford Courant, No\'. 24, 1976, at 
30, col. 5. 
102. The New Haven Journal-Courier, Nov. 19, 1975, at I, col. I, Judge Saden's 
comments to the striking teachers were reported in the New Haven papers: 
THE COURT: I think what some of you ladies and gentlemen don't seem to 
understand is that you have placed yourselves in the category of being law­
breakers.... 
You are supposed to inspire the young, impressionable minds that >'ou teach 
and your credibility with your students has been seriously impaired b>' your 
conduct in violating the law. You, above all other types of persons, should have 
been aware of this long ago. 
What can you say to your students when you return to school and the)' 
point-
A VOICE: I would like to answer­
THE COURT: Don't be a wise guy. 
A VOICE: I am not, but I volunteer to answer that question. 
THE COURT: These are rhetorical questions, and don't get too smart or 
you'll wind up in further trouble. 
Of course, it is not a matter of concern for me in pronouncing sentence upon 
you for this civil contempt, but I merely point out to you tllat as law breakers, it 
would seem to me that the Board of Education would have the right to dismiss 
you from your jobs, if they saw fit to do so. 
But if you think it is smart to violate the law, if you think it is smart to decide 
for yourselves what you think is right, regardless of what the Legislature has 
said is right, then you have taken the first step toward what amounts to anarchy. 
If everyone of us is free to decide for himself what he will do or won't do and 
completely disregard the law, we no longer have the kind of democrae>' this 
country is supposed to be. It is all well and good to talk about freedom and we 
all believe in it, but freedom abused is no freedom at all. 
The course of violating the law in the fashion that you have chosen to do is 
purely self-defeating, it is one in which you cannot possibly prevail because it 
is a confrontation not with the Board of Education-you are not here fighting 
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the law, some observers believed that he actually increased the 
resolvel03 and the relative bargaining power of the strikers. l04 One 
can never know for certain, and no one advocates running a con­
trolled experiment with another strike in New Haven. Nonetheless. 
some management lawyers believe that the jailing of teachers only 
serves to increase their bargaining power, while others hold that the 
jailing of union leaders, such as happened in Shelton,105 may bring a 
strike to an abrupt end. Since both sides may point to strikes in Con­
necticut to prove their point, the matter remains unresolved. How­
ever, it is the exception, not the rule, for the judiciary to jail striking 
teachers. The New Haven experience is atypical. 
The 1976 Amendments have not solved the problem of impasse 
resolution. Whether the state will see fewer strikes under the 
changes remains to be seen. Where strikes are caused by the lack of 
funds, no change in the bargaining laws can make a difference. Now 
that the present system of funding school education has been de­
clared unconstitutional by Horton v. Meskill,lo6 more state funds 
must be made available to the poorer communities. However, not all 
teacher strikes have occurred in poverty pockets, as proven by the 
recent strike in Greenwich. 
When a town is forced for lack of funds to layoff tenured 
teachers, as is happening now in Connecticut, bargaining over in­
creases in pay for those teachers who remain is difficult. Whether 
teachers ought to have the right to strike, or whether impasses 
should be broken by binding arbitration, are questions which are at 
bottom political. Both methods present problems. A strike cannot 
produce money where none exists, although a strike may produce 
the Board of Education this morning-you are fighting a court order, and the 
confrontation is between the courts and you. 
The court has no alternative in this case but to send all of you to jail, and to 
impose a fine on each of you, per diem, of $250. 
I find you all in contempt. I impose a jail sentence upon each one of you. I 
impose a fine of $250, per diem, on each one of you. 
The New Haven Register, Nov. 23, 1975, at 3B, col. 1. 
103. According to one account, "[Als the mass jailing grew more imminent, teaclwrs 
seemed firmer than ever in their resolve to 'go it all the way: " The New Haven Regis­
ter, Nov. 18, 1975, at 1, col. 7. 
104. As the strike progressed, other school employees engaged in a sympathy strike, 
and "[a] citywide coalition of labor unions ... threatened a half-day [general) strike for 
Tuesday if the 90 were still in jail:' The New Haven Journal-Courier, Nov. 24, 1975, at 
42, col. 2. 
105. The Hartford Courant, Nov. 14, 1975, at 37, col. 3. 
106. 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). 
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money which was only in hiding. Final offer arbitration may induce 
better bargaining, more compromise by both sides, but it may also 
produce contracts that neither side can live with. It would appear 
that so long as the two major teacher organizations in Connecticut 
maintain different points of view over which ought to replace the 
present system, final offer arbitration or the right to strike, the Gen­
eral Assembly will do nothing. 
VIII. UNFAffi LABOR PRACTICES 
The 1965 Act contained no unfair labor practice sections. The 
Act did require both labor and management to bargain in good 
faith;107 and it required boards of education to give rival teacher or­
ganizations "equal access" to teachers and school facilities. lOS The Act 
also prohibited the employer from interfering with teachers who ex­
ercised their rights of self-organization. lo9 But that was all. The 1965 
Act did not contain the equivalent of subsection B(a) or 8(b) of the 
National Labor Relations Act.ll0 In addition, the 1965 Connecticut 
Act did not give to an administrative agency the power to remedy vio­
lations of the duty of good faith bargaining, or the duty not to inter­
fere with teachers' rights, or the duty to give equal access. No labor 
board enforced these rights. If a dispute arose concerning them. the 
only recourse was litigation, a costly and time-consuming procedure. 
All of this changed in 1976. The Amendmentsll1 prohibit certain 
conduct by both labor and management. Management is prohibited 
from 1) interfering with the exercise of rights under the Act;112 
2) dominating or interfering with a teacher organization;113 3) dis­
criminating against a teacher who invokes the Act;114 4) refusing to 
107. Carom. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at CoSN. GE.~. STAT. 
§ 10-153d (1977». The provisions concerning good faith bargaining are now located in 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e (1977). 
108. This applied if no organization represented the teachers. See CONN. GE.~. STAT. 
§ 100153d (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1977)). During elec­
tions, both organizations had a right to equal access under Cmm. GE.~. STAT. § 10-153c 
(1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153c (1977». 
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153a (1975) (current version at COSS. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153a (1977». 
110. National Labor Relations Act § 8,29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). 
111. 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts 76-403 (amending CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 100153a to 153g 
(1975». The specific amendments which prohibit this conduct are codified at CoSN. 
GEN. STAT. § 100153e(b)-(d) (1977). 
112. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-I53e(b)(I) (1977). 
113. Carom. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(b)(2) (1977). 
114. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(b)(3) (1977). 
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bargain in good faith;115 and 5) refusing to participate in good faith in 
mediation or arbitration. 116 As will be seen, the most important of 
these, and the one which will probably involve the most litigation, is 
the refusal to bargain in good faith. The union unfair labor practice 
provisions track management provisions (except that labor cannot be 
charged with domination or interference)117 and add a new one: "so­
liciting or advocating support from public school students."uB 
"Good faith bargaining" is defined by the 1976 Amendments just 
as it is in the National Labor Relations Act:119 the duty to meet, and 
attempt to reach agreement, and the executing of a written contract 
incorporating any agreement. Like the National Labor Relations 
Act120 the Amendments provide that "such obligation shall not com­
pel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. "121 And, in a most Significant decision, the General As­
sembly in 1976 gave the power to remedy unfair labor practices to 
the State Board of Labor Relations. 122 Now, for the first time in 
Connecticut, teachers and boards of education have an administrative 
agency, with expertise in labor relations, to resolve the difficult and 
sensitive questions that arise during bargaining. 
Adding unfair labor practices to the Labor Board's jurisdiction 
will probably prove to be a mixed blessing. Boards and teacher or­
ganizations with honest differences of opinion over what is bargain­
able may now resolve those differences in an orderly way. But incor­
poration of the language of the National Labor Relations Act cannot 
help but make teacher bargaining more complicated. Regulation of 
activity by law inevitably invites lawyers into the process. What may 
have been informal and flexible may now become rigid and technical. 
And now that the Labor Board is available to enforce the unfair labor 
practice provisions in the Act, one side or the other invariably will 
attempt to use the Labor Board as a bargaining lever. 
Perhaps the most immediate and dramatic effect of the Amend­
ments will be to require management to bargain before making 
changes in working conditions. Does the employer have the right 
115. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(b)(4) (1977). 
116. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153e(b)(5) (1977). 
117. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153e(c)(1)-(5) (1977). 
118. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(c)(5) (1977). 
119. Compare § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), 
with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(d) (1977). 
120. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). 
121. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153e(d) (1977). 
122. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O-153e(e)-(i) (1977). 
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during the life of the agreement to make changes in conditions which 
are not covered by the agreement? Professors Cox and Dunlop an­
swered this question with a qualified "no," in an article written about 
the private sector almost thirty years ago. 123 Before an employer may 
make changes in major conditions not covered by the contract, it 
must first bargain with the union. 124 The unilateral change in a condi­
tion of employment is a refusal to bargain. This is elementary labor 
law. The rule applies with equal vigor after the ex-piration of the 
con tract. 125 
The State Board of Labor Relations has adopted the Cox-Dunlop 
view.126 For example, the Shelton Board of Education stopped pay­
ing wage increments to nonteachers after the contract ex-pired, and 
was ordered to resume payments because the reduction took place 
without bargaining to an impasse. 127 Before this decision, some 
boards of education refused to grant increments after the contract 
expired, in order to pressure the employees to come to an agree­
ment. 128 This can no longer be done prior to impasse. By making the 
refusal to bargain an unfair labor practice, and by placing enforce­
ment power in the Labor Board, the General Assembly has incorpo­
rated the theories that prevail in the private sector governing unilat­
eral changes in conditions. 
The 1976 Amendments also mean that the state now has an effi­
cient method for resolving disputes over what is bargainable. Under 
the 1965 Act, when the parties had an honest difference of opinion on 
123. Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During tIle Ternl of .<\11 Exist­
ing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1097 (1950). 
124. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 
125. Once the parties have reached an impasse, however, the employer is free to 
make unilateral changes. AAA Motor Lines, 215 N.L.R.B. 793, 88 L.R.R.~t. 1253 (1974). 
See also NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217 (1949). 
126. See Town of Ridgefield, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1537 l~ta)' 16, 
1977) (unilateral change in grooming standards violated the duty to bargain): Town of 
Hamden, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1484 aan. 24, 1977) (unilateral institu­
tion of compensation for new position violated the duty to bargain): City of Stamford, 
State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1473 (Dec. 27, 1976) (unilateral change in 
gasoline benefit violated the duty to bargain); City of Willimantic, State Bd. of Labor 
Relations Dec. No. 1455 (Nov. 23, 1976) (finding an impasse): Town of Newington, 
State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1116 (Mar. 22, 1973); City of Milford, State Bd. of 
Labor Relations Dec. No. 1973 aan. 19, 1973). 
127. Shelton Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. :-10. 1458 (Dec. 8, 
1976). See also Ledyard Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. :-10. 1564 (Aug. 
15, 1977); Windsor Police Dep't, State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. !IIo. 1064 (~lay 3, 
1972). 
128. The Hartford Board of Education withheld increments in 1975. See Hartford 
Fed'n of Teachers v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., No. 199139 (Super. Ct. No\,. 20, 1975). 
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the matter, they had no choice but to litigate. The 1972 Connecticut 
Supreme Court decision ofWest Hartford Education Association, Inc. 
v. DeCourcyl29 was an effort to find guidance on the question of 
which subjects are mandatory subjects of bargaining. DeCourcy ruled 
that hours of employment were not a mandatory subject of ne­
gotiation. l3o The court determined that the length or schedule of the 
work day was not included in the statutory language "conditions of 
employment." The result has never been overturned. l3l 
There remain a number of issues regarding the duty to bargain 
which will now be resolved by the Labor Board: Does the duty to 
bargain include issues such as summer school?l32 part-time teachers? 
substitutes?133 medical benefits for retired teachers? early retire­
ment? selection of coaches? adult education? hiring of teacher aides? 
the selection of projects for federal funding? The Labor Board will 
have to develop an approach, using for guidance the statute, the 
unique nature of public education, and precedents from the private 
sector.l34 The important point is this: the participants in teacher bar­
gaining now have a place to go to resolve questions of what is negoti­
129. 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972). 
130. The 1965 Act required bargaining over "salaries and other conditions of em­
ployment...." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 10-153d (1977». The words in the National Labor Relations Act § 8{d) are, "wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158{d) (1970). The 
Connecticut Supreme Court in DeCourcy found that the difference in words Indicated a 
difference in meaning. 162 Conn. at 578-80, 295 A.2d at 534. Thus, boards need not 
bargain over the length of the school day and the school calendar. 162 Conn. at 580, 295 
A.2d at 534. By the same reasoning, "conditions of employment" would mean somc­
thing different from "terms and conditions of employment." What the difference would 
be is unclear. 
131. When the 1976 Amendments were first introduced, the duty to bargain wns 
defined as encompassing "salaries, hours, and other conditions of employment." Raised 
Comm. Bill No. 5117, § 4, LCO No. 719. The Substitute Raised Comm. Bill No. 5117 
dropped the term "hours." 
132. The State Board of Labor Relations has answered, "Yes." West Hartford Bd. of 
Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1533 (June 28, 1977) ("We conclude that 
the teaching of summer school is bargaining unit work and thnt those who are employed 
for such teaching are bargaining unit employees.") 
133. A substitute employed regularly 184 days each year is a member of the bargain­
ing unit, not a "temporary substitute." Wethersfield Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Lnbor 
Relations Dec. No. 1560 (July 26, 1977). See also Wallingford Bd. of Educ., Stnte Bd. of 
Labor Relations Dec. No. 1565 (Aug. 16, 1977). 
134. The State Department of Education issued extensive guidelines in 1975 cover­
ing the scope of negotiations. See Zirkel, Guidelines for Teacher-Board Negotlatlolls III 
Connecticut, 50 CONN. B.J. 127 (1976). These guidelines are neither statutes nor regula­
tions, and their impact on the actual conduct of bargaining has been only marginal. 
Whether the State Board of Labor Relations will use these guidelines as persuasivc 
authority is not known. 
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able. Before 1976, as a practical matter,135 they had nowhere to go. 
Although such questions may not be as crucial in teacher bar­
gaining as in the private sector-a union under the National Labor 
Relations Act may strike over a mandatory subject of bargaining, but 
not over a permissive one, whereas teachers may not strike at all 
-still there are cases in which the scope of bargaining is well worth 
litigating. In one of the first cases involving teachers decided by the 
State Board of Labor Relations, the West Hartford Board of Educa­
tion was ordered to bargain over summer schooJ.136 And in another 
case, the Wethersfield Board of Education was ordered to bargain 
over the salary of a long-term substitute. 137 
x. MISCELLANEOUS 
Among the other 1976 changes which are by no means minor in 
nature are these: The agency shop appears to have been outlawed;138 
mediators cannot be forced to testify about negotiations;139 the 
teacher organizations must designate an agent for service of pro­
cess;l40 and impasse arbitrators and mediators are entitled to receive 
the prevailing fee for such service. 141 
The General Assembly has required university professors at state 
institutions to join the union or pay the equivalent in dues;l42 state 
135. The guidelines of the State Department of Education defined the scope of bar­
gaining, but could not coerce unwilling parties into compliance. 
136. West Hartford Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dt.'C. No. 1553 Uune 
28, 1977}. 
137. Wethersfield Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. No. 1560 Uulr 26, 
1977}. 
138. This was done br adding to the right not to "join" a teacher organization, the 
right not to "assist" one. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153a (1975) lcilll Coss. 
GEN. STAT. § 10-153a (1977). 
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1977). ("In any ch·il or criminal caSt" anr pro­
ceeding preliminary thereto, or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, a medi­
ator shall not disclose any confidential communication made to him in the course of his 
duties unless the party making such communication wah'es such privilege.") 
140. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153i (1977). 
141. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f(b), (c)(I) (1977). Before the Amendments, arbi­
trators were entitled to $60 per day. See COl'.'N. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1975) (current 
version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153f (1977», setting the fcc at the Coss. GE..... STAT. 
§ 31-94 (1975) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-94 (1977)) mte, or $60, 
perhaps a fair sum when first enacted, but today only one-fifth the pre\'ailing mtes for 
nationally recognized arbitrators. 
142. See 1975 Conn. Pub. Acts 75-566 (codified at CONN. GES. STAT. § 5-280 (1977)). 
providing in part: 
If an exclusive representative has been deSignated for tile employees in an ap­
propriate collective bargaining unit, each employee in such unit who is not a 
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policy with respect to public school teachers is precisely the opposite: 
the 1976 Amendments appear to have outlawed the agency shop.143 
The reason for this difference in policy appears to be political. Now 
that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution 
does not outlaw the agency shop in public schools,144 the teacher 
organizations may attempt to change the Teacher Act. 
The 1976 Amendments prohibit mediators from revealing confi­
dential information. 145 This amendment was prompted by a subpoena 
issued to one of the state mediators146 in a dispute over whether an 
impasse was reached during bargaining. The mediator never testified. 
But the unresolved legal issue remained. 147 Mediation depends upon 
the integrity of the mediator, and the absolute confidentiality of 
communications. 148 If a party knew that the other side could sub­
poena the mediator and force that person to testify about what was 
said, mediation would no longer be effective. The Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service will not permit its mediators to testify in any 
member of the exclusive representative shall be required, as a condition of con­
tinued employment, to pay to such organization for the period that it is the 
exclusive representative, an amount equal to the regular dues, fees and assess­
ments that a member is charged. 
This provision, in the State Employees Collective Bargaining Act, applies to any state 
employee, not just university professors. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-270(a) (1977). 
143. See note 138 supra. 
144. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977). However, the Court also 
ruled that public employees could not be compelled to pay for "ideological activities 
unrelated to collective bargaining." 97 S. Ct. at 1800. That portion of the dues spent for 
political purposes must, upon demand, be returned to the protesting employee. 97 S. Ct. 
at 1802-03. 
145. See note 139 supra. 
146. Professor Cornelius J. Scanlon of the University of Connecticut School of Law. 
147. Professor Scanlon thereby lost the opportunity to test his legal opinion that 
mediators could not be forced to testify. Connecticut mediators employed by the State 
Board of Mediation and Arbitration were already protected. See CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 31-100 (1977). 
148. These assertions should be self-evident. See generally on the subject of 
mediator confidentiality W. MAGGIOLO, TECHNIQUES OF MEDIATION IN LABon DIS­
PUTES 35-37 (1971): 
As previously mentioned the policy of the United States is to rely on colIective 
bargaining and mediation as the principal means of resolving industrial con­
flicts. To effectuate that policy mediators must not only be impartial but must 
be considered so by both parties to a labor dispute. In addition, the parties 
must be free to talk without risking subsequent disclosure of their confidence. 
Such confidence and disclosures are wholly voluntary and cannot be compelled 
by a mediator, but without them mediation would cease to be effective in settl­
ing labor disputes. 
Id. at 35. 
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proceeding.149 However, until 1976, it was not clear whether Con­
necticut teacher mediators had the same privilege. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1976 Amendments to the Connecticut Teacher Negotiation 
Act left the basic structure of teacher collective bargaining intact. The 
most significant changes were the addition of statutory prohibitions of 
unfair labor practices and the granting of jurisdiction over unfair labor 
practice disputes to the State Board of Labor Relations. \Vhile the 
timetable for bargaining was altered, with bargaining now to com­
mence 180 days before a municipality's budget submission date, it 
remains to be seen whether this will affect the way negotiators be­
have. Including the fiscal authority in the negotiation process appears 
frankly to be experimental, and it is too early to determine whether 
the change is a success. lSO 
Now that the State Board of Labor Relations has jurisdiction over 
a part of the teacher negotiation process, the General Assembly may 
well consider shifting to the Labor Board the power to conduct 
elections. lSI This would allow the Labor Board to make final deci­
sions over the bargaining unit during the election. It would eliminate 
149. 	 29 C.F.R. § 1401.2 (1976) provides in part: 
No officer, employee, or other person officially connected in all}' C'.Ipacity with 
the Service, shall produce or present any confidential records of the Service or 
testify on behalf of any party to any cause pending in any arbitr.ltioll or other 
proceedings or court or before any board, commission, committee, tribunal, in­
vestigatory body, or administrative agency of the United States or of ,lilY State, 
Territory, The District of Columbia or any municipality with respect to facts or 
other matters coming to his knowledge in his official capacity or with respl.'Ct to 
the contents of any confidential records of the Service, whether in answer to an 
order, subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, or otherwise, Witllout the prior written 
consent of the Director. 
Connecticut State Mediators were protected by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-100 (1977). 
The Code of Professional Conduct for Labor Mediators, adopted jointly by the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service and the several state agencies represented b)' tile 
Association of Labor Mediation Agencies is explicit: "Confidential inform<ltion required 
by the mediator should not be disclosed to others for <lny purpose or in a legal proceed­
ing...." See W. SIMKIN, supra note 82, at 392. 
150. As of mid-August of 1977, 16 municipalities did not ha\'e teacher contracts, 
compared to 70 a year ago. See The Hartford Courant, Aug. 22, 1977, at 3D, col. 7. 
151. The State Board of Labor Relations currently conducts all elections among non­
certified employees of boards of education, under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-471 (1977). 
See, e.g., Norwalk Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dl'C. No. 1559 Uul)' 22, 
1977) (whether school monitors should be added to unit of custodians, drivers, and 
maintenance workers); East Haddam Bd. of Educ., State Bd. of Labor Relations Dec. 
No. 1519 (March 3D, 1977) (secretaries, library clerks, teacher aides, and custodians). 
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the ever-present possibility that a moderator will allow a person to 
vote and the Labor Board will thereafter declare that person outside 
of the bargaining unit (or vice versa). Giving the elections over to the 
Labor Board would enable it to resolve differences between teacher 
organizations and boards of education over election campaign prac­
tices and would make possible formal post-election challenges. This 
change would not be without costs. The present use of the AAA is 
fast and efficient. The decisions of the moderators, right or wrong, 
are final. Bargaining is not delayed by post-election challenges. The 
choice, as always, is between speed and efficiency on the one hand, 
and consistency on the other. 
The largest unknown is the impact of Horton v. Meskill. 152 It is 
always easier to reach an agreement when there is money in the till. 
How much money this decision will bring to some of the hard­
pressed school districts is the question that the state will be facing 
during the next few years. It may ultimately have a greater impact on 
bargaining than the 1976 Amendments. Until the state money begins 
to flow, however, negotiators will continue to struggle with the prob­
lems of taxes, inflation, town nullification, and teacher strikes. The 
1976 Amendments have, on balance, improved the Act, but further 
improvements are warranted. 
152. 172 Conn. 615,376 A.2d 359 (1977). 
